* Increase alpine version to fix security issue with apk-tools
* Upgrade jwt dependency to fix a security issue
* Update miekg/dns dependency to the latest one
* Upgrade some librairies to get rid of 'github.com/gogo/protobuf@v1.3.1'
For that, upgrade the following dependencies:
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
github.com/nats-io/nats.go
github.com/nats-io/stan.go
Walk() and Merge code can return dir__XLDIR__ as the last element
on a page list and dir__XLDIR__ as the first element in the next list page.
dir__XLDIR__ is shown in the second-page list because the marker set to
dir/ is meant to skip dir/ and not dir__XLDIR__
To fix this, the code will avoid adding the marker itself to the listing
result.
parentDirIsObject is not using set level understanding
to check for parent objects, without this it can lead to
objects that can actually reside on a separate set as
objects and would conflict.
This commit fixes a security issue in the signature v4 chunked
reader. Before, the reader returned unverified data to the caller
and would only verify the chunk signature once it has encountered
the end of the chunk payload.
Now, the chunk reader reads the entire chunk into an in-memory buffer,
verifies the signature and then returns data to the caller.
In general, this is a common security problem. We verifying data
streams, the verifier MUST NOT return data to the upper layers / its
callers as long as it has not verified the current data chunk / data
segment:
```
func (r *Reader) Read(buffer []byte) {
if err := r.readNext(r.internalBuffer); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := r.verify(r.internalBuffer); err != nil {
return err
}
copy(buffer, r.internalBuffer)
}
```
some SDKs might incorrectly send duplicate
entries for keys such as "conditions", Go
stdlib unmarshal for JSON does not support
duplicate keys - instead skips the first
duplicate and only preserves the last entry.
This can lead to issues where a policy JSON
while being valid might not properly apply
the required conditions, allowing situations
where POST policy JSON would end up allowing
uploads to unauthorized buckets and paths.
This PR fixes this properly.
attempt a delete on remote DNS store first before
attempting locally, because removing at DNS store
is cheaper than deleting locally, in case of
errors locally we can cheaply recreate the
bucket on dnsStore instead of.
as there is no automatic way to detect if there
is a root disk mounted on / or /var for the container
environments due to how the root disk information
is masked inside overlay root inside container.
this PR brings an environment variable to set
root disk size threshold manually to detect the
root disks in such situations.
addtionally introduce MINIO_DELETE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL environment
value to control this interval, choose a lesser value if higher
speed is necessary. Supports time.Duration format
expory MINIO_DELETE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL=1m
Would let MinIO run delete cleanup interval every minute, once
the previous cycle completes.
If the periodic `case <-t.C:` save gets held up for a long time it will end up
synchronize all disk writes for saving the caches.
We add jitter to per set writes so they don't sync up and don't hold a
lock for the write, since it isn't needed anyway.
If an outage prevents writes for a long while we also add individual
waits for each disk in case there was a queue.
Furthermore limit the number of buffers kept to 2GiB, since this could get
huge in large clusters. This will not act as a hard limit but should be enough
for normal operation.
